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D

NOTATION
We respectfully direct the Court's attention to the
fact that Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 are the verbatim transcripts of proceedings of the hearings before the
Defendant-Appellant Union's Trial Board at the Statler
Hotel in Los Angeles, California, on June 3, 4 and 7,
1954. Those proceedings are reprinted in full in the
Appendix tendered to the Court with this brief.
Accordingly, whenever reference is made to Exhibits
3, 4 or 5, the Court may, for the purpose of convenience, refer directly to the Appendix to our brief,
rather than search through the official papers in the
record for those exhibits.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TROY 0. NANCE and
THOMAS B. HANLEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,
Case

vs.

No. 9111

SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
an unincorporated association,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief for Defendant and Appellant
THE FORM OF THE RECORD
The case on appeal is based on an exceedingly voluminous record encompassing two trials, one to the court
below sitting without a jury and the other before a common-law jury. During the two trials, 191 exhibits were
introduced, most of which were admitted into evidence by
the court.
In order to refer with facility to the massive accumulation of transcripts and documents in the record, many of
which have independent, and thus parallel, pagination, the
following code will be observed:
1. References to the record of all of the pleadings and
other papers on file will be thus: (R. 1-729) etc.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

2.

References to testimony in the trial to the court
sitting without a jury will be thus: (N.J.T. 1-6170)
etc.
3. References to testimony in the jury trial will be
thus: (J.T. 1-2952) etc.
4. References to pre-trial proceedings will be thus:
(Pre-T., 2-2-59, 1-55) etc. 1
5. References to post-trial proceedings will be thus:
(Post-T., 4-6-59, 1-35) etc.

The parties to the litigation should also be explicitly
designated at the outset of the brief, because the Appellant
in this court was the Respondent in the court below,
whereas the Petitioner in the trial court is now designated
as one of the Respondents in connection with the appeal.
Hereafter the parties will be referred to as follows:
Troy 0. Nance will be referred to as "PlaintiffRespondent Nance,'' or sometimes merely as
''Nance.''
2. Thomas B. Hanley will be referred to as ''Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley,'' or sometimes merely as
''Hanley.''
3. Troy 0. Nance and Thomas B. Hanley may sometimes be referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs-Respondents.''
4. Sheet Metal Workers International Association
will be referred to as "Defendant-Appellant Union,'' or sometimes merely as ''Union.''
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by two expelled ex-members of a
labor union for reinstatement to membership and damlPage references are to the typewritten page numbers rather than
the numbering machine.
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ages. Each of the expelled ex-members (Plaintiff-Respondent Nance and Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley) had a
separate and independent cause of action, but the two suits
wpre consolidated by consent of the trial court which permitted :Hanley to intervene in Nance's Petition for Writ
of :Mandate (Civil No. 3783). Hanley's Complaint in Intervention (R. 131-141) was not in the .form of a petition
for writ of mandate, however, and this distinction has significance in connection with the issue of the allowance of
attorneys fees, as will later be pointed out.
The two Plaintiffs-Respondents claimed, in their respective suits, that they were wrongfully and maliciously
expelled from Defendant-Appellant Union, an unincorporated labor union (with headquarters or General Offices in
\Vashington, D. C.) which, along with its affiliated local unions, has represented employees in the sheet metal
trade for more than 7'5 years. They each sought approximately the same kind of relief, namely: a declaratory
judgment that the expulsions were illegal, reinstatement to
union membership, actual and exemplary damages, allowance of attorneys fees, and costs. Compare: amendment to
Petition for Writ of Mandate, May 21, 1958 (R. 208-210)
with Complaint in Intervention (R. 140).
The court below found for the Plaintiffs-Respondents
on the first two items. It issued a declaratory judgment that
their expulsions were illegal and void for lack of a valid
hearing on the charges preferred against them, and an order directing their reinstatement to membership, subject
to the right of Defendant-Appellant Union to conduct another hearing or trial on the charges preferred against
them, in which they would be accorded their alleged due;
process rights. (R. 656-657).
Defendant-Appellant Union has appealed from this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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portion of the judgment, )Vh~ch was based on a ten week
trial to the court below :~re_~ without a jury. The nonjury trial (or phase of the case) commenced October 6,
1958, and lasted until December 19, 1958. See Memorandum of Decision of December 30, 1958 (R. 347-353) and
Supplemental Memorandum of Decision of January 9, 1959
(R. 354).
At the conclusion of the first (or non-jury) phase of
the case, the trial court expressly refused to announce its
decision as to the issues of malice and bad faith on the part
of the officers of Defendant-Appellant Union in connection
with the expulsion of Plaintiffs-Respondents, for the
avowed reason that an announcement of such decision
would undoubtedly influence the assessment of damages
for the wrongful expulsions to be made by the jury subsequently to be empaneled. (R. 353). Accordingly, the court,
over the vigorous protest of Defendant-Appellant Union
(Pre-T. 1-13-59, 36-43); proposed to withhold, until after
the jury trial was over, disclosure of its decision whether
the expulsion proceedings were malicious and brought in
bad faith, as well as invalid.
Shortly thereafter, on January 21, 1959, the trial court
further announced that he, and not the jury, would decide
the question whether exemplary damages should lie against
Defendant-Appellant Union on account of alleged malice
or bad faith on the part of its officers in procuring the expulsions of Plaintiffs-Respondents. All other damage
issues in the case (including other exemplary damage
claims) were to be thrown to the jury. (R. 367-369).
The action above was taken by the court despite the
fact that:
(1) theretofore, the Plaintiffs-Respondents filed a
formal demand for trial of damage issues by a
jury (R. 288) ;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

theretofore, on January 13, 1959, in the course of
a pre-trial hearing, the court asserted that he
would not (and could not unless the jury empaneled were merely advisory in nature) decide the
question of exemplary damages for such alleged
malice or bad faith unless counsel stipulated that
such question should be decided by the court.
''Otherwise it would be a jury question to decide." (Pre.-T. 1-13-59, 11-12) ; and
(3)

theretofore, on January 18, 1959, Defendant-Appellant Union formally declined to stipulate th~t
such question should be decided by the court and,
to the contrary, announced that pursuant to
Rule 39 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
it ''hereby consents to the trial of the aforesaid
case by jury, whose verdict shall have the same
effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of
right upon all issues not heretofore decided by
the court.'' ( R. 360). See also ( R. 371-372).

Interestingly, the trial court did not attempt to reserve for
itself the determination of any compensatory damages (R.
367-369).
A jury was subsequently empaneled and a jury trial
was had of all of the damage issues involved in, or flowing from, the expulsions of Plaintiffs-Respondents, except,
of course, those withheld from the jury by the court. The
jury trial phase lasted five weeks, from February 9, 1959,
until March 13, 1959.
The jury returned a general verdict for DefendantAppellant Union and, in answer to twelve special interrogatories prepared by the trial court, it specially found that
(R. 550-551):
Neither Nance nor Hanley suffered a loss of income from and after July 1, 1954 (the approximate
date of the expulsions) as a proximate result of being
expelled from the Union,

1.
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2. Neither Nance nor Hanley (at any time) suffered
humiliation or mental suffering as a proximate result
thereof, and
3. None of the officers or authorized agents of Defendant-Appellant Union (at any time) wilfully and
wrongfully (a) prevented Nance or Hanley from getting work as a sheet metal worker or (b) induced employers to fire or refuse to hire either of them.
[Note: this finding if it had been resolved otherwise
was to serve as the predicate for an allowance of exemplary damages.]
Plaintiffs-Respondents Nance and Hanley filed motions for a new trial (R. 558-559 and 567-568) and for entry
of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. '556-557),
both of which were denied by the trial court. (R. 615-622).
The two Plaintiffs-Respondents have cross-appealed from
the denial of those two motions and from the portion of
the final judgment denying them damages on those alleged grounds or theories.
On the same day that the motions for a new trial and
for a judgment n.o.v. were denied, to wit: May 2, 1959, the
trial court issued a ''Second Supplemental Memorandum of
Decision" (R. 600-614). In this document (which was
filed some six weeks after the jury Yerdict was returned)
the trial court held, notlnYithstanding the findings of the
jury that neither Nance nor Hanley had up to the time of
the trial suffered any actual damage as a result of their
respective expulsions, that they were nevertheless each entitled to judgment against Defendant-Appellant Union for
nominal damages of $1.00. He concluded further that the
actions of Defendant-Appellant Union in expelling Nance
and Hanley were unreasonable, arbitrary, and malicious,
as well as illegal, whereupon he awarded Nance and HanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lt>y exemplary damages of $20,000.00 apiece. Finally he
allowed each of them to recover an additional $7,000.00
against Defendant-Appellant Union as an allowance of reasonable attorneys' fees for the 10-week (non-jury) phase
of the case in which the issue of the legality of the expulsions was litigated.

Defendant-Appellant Union has appealed from the last
described portions of the final judgment and the findings
and conclusions upon which they are based.
It might be said that Defendant-Appellant Union is appealing from all of the issues (or matters) decided by the
trial court, and that the Plaintiffs-Respondents are crossappealing from all issues (or matters) submitted to and
determined by the jury.

INTRODUCTION
\Ve believe that much, and probably most, of the testimony and documentary evidence in this long and tedious
case is surplusage.
While the case involves some complicated issues, the
basic issue that can undercut all of the others is simply
whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents, Nance and Hanley,
were afforded, and declined or refused to avail themselves
of, an opportunity to stand trial before a union trial board
on charges of misconduct. We believe this must be answered in the affirmative; and such a holding would largely
dispose of the case.
The union trials that ultimately took place (if they
can be called trials) were held in the absence of the Plaintiffs-Respondents (in absentia). This is not the normal,
the preferable, or the recommended kind of union trial, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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\

we make no contention that trials in absentia can be equated with trials in the generally accepted sense of the term.
It is perfectly clear-and the constitution of Defendant-Appellant Union in Article Eighteen, Section 2{h)
(Exh. 53, p. 75, 76) bears this out fully-that DefendantAppellant Union does not favor trials in absentia. It only
condones them as a last resort in the event that the accused
should "refuse, fail or neglect to appear for the trial."
Then the trial is to proceed despite a refusal, failure, orneglect. by the accused to appear and evidence is to be taken
in absentia, somewhat analogous to the practice in courts of
calling witnesses and taking evidence in the course of issuing a default judgment, rather than merely issuing judgment upon the bare allegations of the complaint.
As will be seen, Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley, on his
own behalf and on behalf of the others (such as PlaintiffRespondent Nance) whom he represented, refused to stand
trial before the union trial board by both his words and,
even more revealing, his atrocious conduct. For one thing,
he flatly refused to abide by the rules for procedure promulgated by the chairman of the Defendant-Appellant
Union's trial board. This alone was enough to frustrate
the intended trials, because the union trial board had no
bailiff, no authority to cite or punish for contempt, .and no
way of compelling compliance with its orders.
In truth, the trials in absentia were forced upon the
Union by Nance and Hanley, rather than '?ice versa.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In a 15 week trial, where the transcript of testimony
and proceedings before the court runs to over 9,000
pages, it is virtually beyond human power to summarize
the facts adduced within the confines of a score of pages.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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< Hn-ionsly,

therefore, a number of facts are going to be ignon·tl in our statement. We have, however, to the extent
that it is feasible, tried to set out the facts which are most
relevant, a great many of which are not controversial. By
"not controversial" we mean that the facts are either conceded by the opposing party, or are corroborated independently through a letter, transcript, affidavit, or some other
kind of documentary evidence, and thus should not be in
dispute on appeal.
Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley was at one time an International Representative of Defendant-Appellant Union. 2
He was removed from that position on March 27, 1954, by
Robert Byron, General President of Defendant-Appellant
Pnion. (N.J.T. 122-123, 2944-2945). His dismissal as an International Representative did not, however, affect his
status as a member in good standing of Defendant-Appellant Union. Hanley and Plaintiff-Respondent Nance were
members in good standing of Defendant-Appellant Union
until their expulsions from membership on June 29, 19'54.

THE GROUNDS OR MOTIVES FOR PREFERRING
CHARGES AGAINST HANLEY AND NANCE
The trial court in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein found that" at the time Byron filed the
charges [against Hanley and Nance accusing them of serious misconduct] he had received reports and information
which, if assumed to be true, would have given him probable cause to believe that the charges which he preferred,
2An International Representative acts on behalf of, and carries out
the instructions of, the General President in the territory to which he
is assigned. He is appointed to this position, and it is strictly an employment at will which may be terminated by the General President for
any reason, "at his pleasure." (N.J.T. 867-880).
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or at least some of them, were true." (R. 648). There can
be no doubt that the finding above is correct.
As early as December of 1953, President Byron got a
verbal complaint about Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley from·
one Henry Ely, Secretary of an employers association
known as Sheet Metal Contractors Association of Southern
California. (N.J.T. 369). At this time, however, Byron had
great confidence in his International Representative (Hanley) and he told Ely to stop meddling in union affairs, and
to take up complaints of that nature with Hanley directly.

(Exh. 77).
Ely refused to be deterred. In February of 1954, he
sent Byron a letter complaining about Hanley, and with it
he enclosed two affidavits. These affidavits accused Hanley and John Fuller and Carl Nichols of using Sheet Metal
Workers Unions in the Los Angeles and Las Vegas areas
as fronts for extortion and shake-down purposes. Ely followed up with a second letter enclosing a third affidavit.
( Exh. 44 and 45). A meeting with Ely and one of the affiants, Ira Fulmor, was promptly arranged thereafter, and it
was held in Chicago, Illinois, on February 25 and 26, 1954.
(N.J.T.1293-1296, 1316).
General President Byron, General Yice Presidents
Cronin, Bruns, and l\Iacioce, General Secretary-Treasurer
Carlough, and General Counsel :Jiulholland met with Fulmor and Ely. Fulmor and Ely talked about a deteriorating labor situation in Los Angeles and Las Vegas generally, and went into detail about shake-downs and strikes
called for extortionate purposes. (N.J.T. 1313-1325). They
said that Hanley and Carl Nichols were large!~· responsible
for the state of affairs, although Nance's name was also
mentioned. (N.J.T. 1356).
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They asked President Byron to investigate the matters
they related, i.e.: the condition in the area under I-Ianley's
··stewardship," and President Byron assured them that he
would do so. (N.J.T. 2882-2885, 3360-3370, 4805-4809). After
Ely and Fulmor left the meeting, the officials of Defendant~\ppellant Union decided, at General Counsel Mulholland's
suggestion, to try to employ Grant Stetter of Washington,
D. C., a former special agent supervisor for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and an attorney, for this purpose.
(N.J.T. 2918-2919, 3370-3371, 4864).
Stetter was hired on March 4, 1954. (N.J.T. 3038-3043,
3307-3310, 48·70-4871). He immediately went to Los Angeles where he associated with him two experienced investigators, O'Malley and Murphey (N.J.T. 4872-4874).
O'Malley and Murphey would report to Stetter, _who, in
turn, would report to President Byron or General Counsel
J[ nlholland.
Stetter made personal reports to President Byron between ,jfarch 16th and April 28th as to the results of the
investigation. (N.J.T. 4875, 4880, 4891-4894,4899, 4902-4906,
4912-4913). Except for one instance of an alleged shake
down attempt at the Statler Hotel, of which charge Hanley
was exhonerated (N.J.T. 4901-4902), he reported evidence
of gross misconduct on the part of Hanley, Carl Nichols,
John Fuller, and, to a lesser extent, Troy Nance and Eugene Say, including such matters as intimidation of local
union members, rigged local union elections, extortions, and
even physical coercion and intimidation of contractors.
Stetter completed his invesigation and prepared a summary of the results about May 9, 1954. (N.J.T. 4926).
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THEPREPARATION OF THE CHARGES
President Byron determined at least as early as the
middle of April, 1954, that he would have to prefer charges
against Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley, Carl Nichols, and
their confederates. He called a special meeting of the General Executive Council between the 15th and 18th of April
at which he explained that charges would be preferred; and
he asked which of the members of the Council would be
able and willing to sit as a trial board. (N.J. T. 3856-3857,
3467, 5147-5148). The trial board was not selected at this
time, however. (N.J.T. 3857).
Following the special meeting of the General Executive Council, President Byron accompanied by General
Counsel Mulholland went to Los Angeles, California.
(N.J.T. 2945-2946). Byron had some personal conferences
with sheet metal contractors and with union members concerning the activities of Hanley, Nichols, and the others accused of misconduct.
Charges were subsequently preferred against Plaintiffs-Respondents Nance and Hanley, and also against Carl
Nichols, John Fuller, and Eugene Say. Nance received his
charges on May 18, 19.54. (Exh. 47).
Hanley claimed that he never did receiYe a set of
charges through the mail, even though one set of charges
was sent to him at his home address and a second set was
mailed to the post office box of his local union, Local 88 of
Las Vegas, Nevada (Exh. 36 and 37; ~.J.T. 1663-1665~
1111-1113, 1664, 1668-1673). Even so, the court below
found that Hanley learned that he had been charged with
misconduct on May 18, 1954, and saw a copy of his charges
at least by ~fay 25, 1954, a full ten days prior to the commencement of his trial (R. 643, paragraph 9).
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THE

ATT~~IPTS

TO HOLD TRIALS

Hanley was notified to appear for trial at the Statler
Hotel in Los Angeles on Thursday, June 3, 1954, at 10:00
a.m. Nance was instructed to appear on the following day,
June 4, 1954, for his trial. Hanley appeared at the appointed place and time, accompanied by Nance, Carl Nichols, John Fuller, and Clem Vaughn. In addition, in Hanley's own words, there were from 50 to 75 rank and file
members of Local Union 108 (Carl Nichols' union and one
of the local unions served by Hanley when he was an International Representative) who, at one time and another,
crowded into the trial room as spectators. (Exh. 11, p. 51;
N.J.T. 2345-2348, 2462-2468, 3726-3727, 3795-3797, 38693870).
Chaos and confusion of indescribable proportions resulted from the first day, June 3rd, through the second
day, June 4th, until on the third day, June 7th, the Chairman of the trial board, General Vice President Rosen, declared that the accused members had refused to stand trial
and the trials were recessed to be continued in absentia.
It is not possible to appreciate the extent of the confusion in the trial room without reading the transcripts
of those hearings. For that reason, we are printing the
verbatim transcripts of the hearings (Exh. 4, 5, and 6) and
tendering them to the court with this brief, as an appendix
thereto.

Hanley, who was acting on behalf of all of the accused,
completely dominated the hearing. He constantly interrupted Chairman Rosen and the other two members of the
trial board, Fitzgerald and Schroeder. His interruption~
were so serious-and so lengthy-that the trial board on occasion actually had to leave the trial room for respite. See:
Exh. 4, p. 111-112; Exh. 5, p. 137-157. He constantly harSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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angued with the trial board, and he would shift to a demand for a new concession whenever the trial board attempted to yield a point to him.
Throughout the course of those three days Hanley
frankly stated that he was not going to submit himself to
trial under the terms and conditions that the trial board afforded. Thus, he first said he wasn't certain whether ho
would agree to stand trial. (Exh. 4, p. 6). A few minutes
later he said he would not stand trial until he had been
furnished with a copy of his charges [with which he was by
then well acquainted] and the procedure for trial. (Exh.
4, p. 29). He next said that he would not stand trial unless Ernest Murphy [Byron's selected representative] left
the trial room and Byron himself prosecuted the charges.
(Exh. 4, p. 96). When Chairman Rosen asked him whether
he would proceed if President Byron came into the trial
room, he then said that Byron would have to be in the room
and prosecute the charges and, furthermore, the trials
would have to be held in Las Vegas rather than Los Angeles. (Exh. 4, p. 100). Still later, Hanley said he would not
stand trial unless it were held in Las Vegas with President
Byron prosecuting and unless he received an extension of
time to prepare his case. (Exh. 4, p. 102). Still later, he
said he would not stand trial until the charges were made
more specific by President ByTon. (Exh. 4, p. 109). Chairman Rosen at that point adjourned the proceedings (Exh.
4, p. 111).
Then, when the hearings resumed the following morning, on June 4th, Hanley took the position that the adjournment the previous day ended his trial. (Exh. 5, p. 115-117).
Chairman Rosen specifically asked Hanley whether he
wanted to resume his trial and he answered:
"I desire to continue my trial if the General President would comply with the Constitution and filing
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the chargef-i properly. I feel that yesterday when the
Trial Board walked out on my trial, and abruptly adjourned the trial, they ended the charges. I feel that
the next move is up to the General office.'' (Exh. 5,
p. 117, 132).
He said he was there merely as counsel for Fuller, Nichols,
or Nance whichever one was to be tried next. (Exh. 5, p.
115-116).
Hanley never changed his attitude, and on June 7,
1954, the last day of the hearing, when he was assigned a
new trial date by Chairman Rosen, i.e.: June 9th, he once
again told Rosen that his trial was adjourned. (Ex. 6, p.
4-7).
If this were not a sufficient declaration of his intention, he made it even plainer the next night. On the evening of June 8th, 1954, Hanley delivered a speech to the
membership of Local Union 108. He referred to the opportunity he was offered on June 3, 4, and 7 at the Statler Hotel to stand trial before the Trial Board and remarked:
'' ... Rather than go down and be tried by Moe Rosen
out of New York City and Rene Schroeder out of
Houston, Texas, and Joe Fitzgerald who I helped defeat as a candidate of the Tri-State Council of the
Sheet :Metal vVorkers, I helped defeat him, I would
rather be tried by William Randolph Hearst. I will
subn1it my case, and I will defend Nichols and Fuller
before anybody, any impartial Board. I will submit it
to this union. There is nothing secretive, they say, but
what did they want us to do today~ They tried to tie.
me up in knots for four days and I have made a jackass out of them, every time, and the record will show
it." (Exh. 11, p. 51).
Rosen stated again and again throughout the three
day period (June 3, 4 and 7) that the hearing would not be
in order until the trial :room was cleared of spectators and
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witnesses. (Ex. 4 p. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32,
33-34, 41, 44, 54-55, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 84, 90; Exh. 5 p. 115,
117-118, 128, 131 ; Exh. 6, p. 4, 17-19). This simple request
never was complied with except for a very short period of
time before the noon recess on June 3rd. (Exh. 4, p. 66).
The clearing of the room was in accordance with Hanley's
direction to the spectators, (Exh. 4, p. 64), but, then, after
the noon recess was over, the spectators came back and
Hanley never again told them to leave. This was despite
Rosen's warning that the trials would not even be called
to order unless they would leave. He plainly stated that no
evidence would be received, no objections to procedure entertained, and no rulings given unless and until this was
done. (Exh. 4, p. 6, 22, 24, 26, 36, 41-42, 49). Hanley was
unwilling to let go of his gallery of sympathizers, however,
and as he, himself, put it in his affidavit of August 5, 1954,
filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia:
"We [Hanley, Nance, Nichols and Fuller] vigorously insisted upon the right of the members
of the Local to hear the trial. Rosen then announced that he would interpret our insistence upon a
trial that was public - so far as the membership of the
Local was concerned - as being a refusal to stand
trial.'' ( Exh. 131, p. 7). (Emphasis ours.)
Still another example of Hanley's obstructionist tactics is where he demanded a ruling from Chairman Rosen
as to how under the constitution he could be tried in Los
Angeles. (Exh. 4, p. 103). Rosen thereupon gave Hanley
the ruling in some detail. (Exh. 4, p. 104). Hanley then
complained that the ruling was not given in writing. (Exh.
4, p. 105).
To add more to the disorder, Carl Nichols, whom Hanley designated as his counsel, along with Vaughn, brought
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a tape recording machine into the trial room the afternoon
of June 3rd, and again on June 4th and June 7th. Rosen
insisted that it be taken out but it never was; and Hanley
never once attempted to assist in having it removed. (Exh.
4, p. 91, 93; Exh. 5, p. 136; Exh. 6, p. 19; N.J.T. 2341, 12281229 1691-1697). When Chairman Rosen insisted that it
'
be taken
out on the first day, June 3rd, Nichols contem- "
putously said to him: "Speak up at it. It won't bite a bit."
(Exh. 4, p. 93). Rosen on several occasions covered the
microphone to the recorder with a water glass, but, whenever he would do this, Nichols would take the glass off.
Chairman Rosen ordered some newspaper reporters
who were present on the first day, June 3rd, to leave. Hanley encouraged them to stay on in disregard of Rosen's
order. To one of the reporters, he said, immediately after
Rosen told him to leave:" Stick around, Mr. Craig, I'd like
to have my story published in the paper." (Exh. 4, p. 28
and also p. 6 and 35-36).
Plaintiff-Respondent Nance was as defiant and uncooperative as Hanley, Nichols, and Fuller, albeit somewhat
less vociferous. He was present through the proceedings
on June 3, 4 and 7, 1954, and refused to leave at Rosen's request on June 3rd so that Hanley's trial could commence.
(Exh. 4, p. 84, 90). He refused to leave upon Rosen's request on June 4th (Exh. 5, p. 122-123), and he told Rosen,
truculently, that he and the other people were going to
stay "to see that the democratic processes are carried out
and this is carried on in a democratic manner and everything above board.''
Nance also, at Hanley's signal, started reading aloud,
over Rosen's protest, his objections to standing trial. Rosen and the rest of the trial board left the room before Nance
finished, but undoubtedly these objections were going to
serve as Nance's excuse for refusing to stand trial. (Exh.
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5, p. 155-156). Nance also tried unsuccessfully, to bait
Chairman Rosen on the third and last day, Monday, eTune
7th. (Exh. 6, p. 16).
The presence of spectators and witnesses in the trial
rooms on June 3, 4 and 7 was both ominous and annoying
•to the trial board. They made the trial room extremely
crowded. (N.J.T. 2345-2348, 2462-2468, 3726-3727, 3730,
379'5-3797, 3867-3868). Their talking and murmuring was
audible in the room. (N.J.T. 2336, 3732-3737, 3802-3803,
3884, 3807-3808, 3869-3870). They were obviously partisan
to Hanley, Nance and the other accused members. (N.J.T.
2337-2339, 2468-2473, 4709-4710).
Captain Joseph E. Stephens of the Los Angeles Police Department appeared at these hearings, accompanied
by several associates, on a tip-off from Jttsge John Fuller
that there might be disruptions at the trials. (N.J.T. 23202322). The police showed up at the first trial session, and
after observing the demeanor of the people in the room,
voluntarily returned for all of the remaining sessions, even
though no one connected with the Defendant-Appellant
Union ever requested police protection or policemen at
the trial sessions. (N.J.T. 2334, 2344, 2351-2352). Although this answer was subsequently improperly stricken
by the trial court, Captain Stephens said he returned to the
trials on the second day (June 4) because he felt that there
would have been a breach of the peace if he wasn't there.
(N.J.T. 2344-2345).
THE TRIALS ARE RECESSED TO BE
HELD IN ABSENTIA
On the third day of the hearings, June 7th, after the
spectators and witnesses still refused to leave the room,
and after Hanley and Nichols still would not take out their
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tape recorder, Chairman Rosen announced that the trials
would be recessed to be continued later in absentia. (Exh.
6, p. 19). It is self-evident, as the transcripts of the hearings on June 3, 4 and 7 show, ( Exh. 4, 5, and 6), that Rosen
and the trial board never had effective control of the hearings, and they were never going to have it. Rosen warned
Hanley and the others that this would happen if his rulings were flouted, but it made no difference to them. (Exh.
-l, p. 49, 33, 56; Exh. 5, p. 131-132).

THE TRIAL BOARD'S LAST CHANCE OFFER
TO STAND TRIAL ON TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1954
The next morning, Tuesday, June 8th, 1954, Hanley,
Nance, and a large group of sheet metal workers again assembled at the Los Angeles Statler Hotel. Chairman Rosen appeared in the lobby and approached Hanley, Nance,
Fuller, and Nichols who were standing by the escalator
platform in the lobby. Other sheet metal workers were
gathered around and could hear all or part of what was
said.
Nichols, who had been absent at the close of the June
7th session, was specifically asked if he would stand trial
in an orderly manner. When Nichols demanded to know
the number of the trial room, Rosen told him that the number would not be divulged but that if he and his counsel
followed the trial board to the room he would be allowed to
call witnesses when they were needed. (N.J.T. 3909-3911).
In substance the same offer was made to Hanley and Nance.
(~.J.T. 3914, 3678-3682, 3648-3650, 2491-2492). This offer
was declined. (N.J. T. 2941).
This "last chance" offer of an opportunity to stand
trial is undisputable. Hanley alluded to it in the ElectriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cians Hall speech. (Ex. 11, p. 51-52). He also referred to it
in his appeal to the General Executive Council from the
decision of the trial board (Exh. 6, p. 4-5), and in the affidavit he filed on August ·5, 1954, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia where he was seeking to have that court enjoin Defendant-Appellant Union
from holding its quadrennial convention in 1\fontreal, Canada, in August of 1954. He there swore:
''He [Rosen] adjourned the trial board meeting.
We did not participate in the trial after this because
we did not know where the trial was being held and because the board would not tell us. They did say that
if we would follow then~ without anybody else, the?J
would take us to the trial romn. '' (Exh. 131, p. 7)
(Emphasis ours.)
THE CONSPIRACY OF HANLEY, NANCE,
NICHOLS AND FULLER TO SABOTAGE THE TRIALS
We want to call the court's attention briefly to the
testimony of witness John Fuller, who evidently was not
credited by the trial court. Fuller was one of the four
members to be tried at the Statler Hotel and a close associate of Hanley. It was Fuller who called Lieutenant (now
Captain) Stephens of the Los Angeles Police Department
on May 30, 1954, and told him there was going to be trouble at the trials at the Statler Hotel on June 3rd, and someone is liable to get hurt. (N.J.T. 2267-2268) [Proffer of
Fuller]. Stephens corroborated this. (N.J.T. 2312, 23202322).
Fuller's testimony from N.tT.T. 2217 to 2280 is a detailed account of the conspiracy to which hr was a party,
along with Hanley, Nance and Nichols, to thwart the trial
board and sabotage the trials. At N.J.T. 2457-2458 he testified that Hanley instructed him and Nichols, just prior
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to the time the trials were to start, to make out as if they
were going to stand trial but never agree to. They were to
talk loud and encourage the men that would be in the room
to join in the -conversation, and do everything except stand
trial. If it got down to technical things, he (Hanley) would
take over.
The transcripts of the trial proceedings on June 3, 4,
and 7 at the Statler Hotel (Exh. 4, 5, and 6) demonstrate
perfect execution of this plan. Fuller's admission of the
conspiracy to block the trials is actually the only ra tiona]
explanation for Hanley's and Nance's aberrant conduct
in the trial room.
THE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA
The Trial Board changed trial rooms after the last
"open hearing" on June 7th and in the afternoon of the
same day it commenced to hear in absentia evidence in the
trial of John Fuller. (Exh. 8, p. 1). Hanley's trial commenced on June 8th at 2:50p.m. (Exh. 7, p. 2) and Nance's
trial on June lOth at 4:05 p. m. (Exh. 10, p. 2). Witnesses
were called to give testimony and documentary matters
were offered and received as exhibits before the trial board.
(Exh. 7, 8, 9, 10).
After the hearings in absentia were concluded, the
members of the trial board conferred privately on the
cases and reached decisions in each of them. There was
one conference on the evening that the last case (Nance's)
was completed (N.J.T. 3972) and a further conference for
more than an hour the following morning. (N.J.T. 3971).
Chairman Rosen put the decision into rough draft form
and then asked General Counsel Mulholland "to polish
them off." (N.J.T. 3972).
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The decisions were against the four members and the
trial board recommended that they be expelled from membership. (Exh. 24 [Decision on Hanley's case] and Exh. 48
[Decision on Nance's case]). The decisions were mailed
out June 29, 1954.

THE APPEALS OF HANLEY AND NANCE
General President Byron disqualified himself from
considering any appeals from the decisions of the tria]
board because he was the charging party, and he advised
Hanley that he and the other members found guilty by the
trial board could appeal directly to the General Executive
Council. (Exh. 26). Hanley and Nance filed appeals from
the decisions of the trial board on August 6th and 7th respectively. (Exh. 27 and 49). Fuller and Nichols appealed
also.
They were notified that their appeals would be considered by the General Executive Council commencing on
August 13, 1954, in Montreal, Canada. (Exh. 28). Hanley,
Fuller and Nichols went to Montreal, Canada, to present
their appeals. Nance did not go, but he authorized Hanley to act as his counsel and representative with respect to
his appeal. (N.J.T. 1456).
Hanley waived all rights to appear before the General Executive Council (Exh. 29), as also did Nichols and
Fuller, so that their cases could be presented to the Grievances and Appeals Committee of Defendant-Appellant
Union's General Convention, and be reported out for appropriate action to the General Convention itselt which
was to meet in Montreal, commencing on August 16, 1954.
Hearings before the Grievances and Appeals CommitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tee took place in :Montreal, Canada, on the Tuesday, \Vedne~day, and Thursday of the week preceding the General
Convention (August lOth, 11th and 12th). (N.J.T. 36273628). The Grievance and Appeals Committee, throng~
its chairman, Frank Burk, and its secretary, Mell Farell,
ruled that no new evidence or testimony would be received
and that the committee would limit itself to consideration
of the transcripts of the trials in Los Angeles and any matters or documents which were contained in the formal written appeals of the parties. (N.J.T. 3555-3556, 3608-3609,
3612-3613, 4392-4394). Hanley presented all of the appeals. (N.J.T. 4389).
The Grievances and Appeals Committee exhonorated
Hanley on one charge on the ground that documentary evidence attached to his formal appeal refuted it. It affirmed the conviction on the other charges, however, and recommended to the General Convention that his expulsion be
upheld. (Exh. 30, p. 62-63). The General Convention, by a
rising vote, adopted the recommendation of the Grievances and Appeals Committee as to Hanley's expulsion,
with 7 dissenting votes. ( Exh. 30, p. 64).
In the case of Troy Nance, the Grievances and Appeals Committee affirmed his conviction on all counts and
recommended that the General Convention uphold its recommendation; which it did, unanimously. (Exh. 30, p. 6566).

FAILURE TO INCLUDE NE\V OR REFUTING
EVIDENCE IN THE FORMAL APPEALS
If Hanley, Nance, and the others had the refuting evidence they claimed, their failure to incorporate it into their
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ley, as a former International Representative, was wellversed on the Defendant-Appellant Union's Constitution.
(Exh. 53.)
Under Section 2(b) of Article Nineteen of DefendantAppellant Union's constitution (Exh. 53, p. 78) it is provided that an appeal to the General President" shall be accompanied by such documentary evidence as the appealing
party may deem necessary for the proper and complete
consideration of his or their appeal."
Under Section 3(a) of Article Nineteen (Exh. 53, P.
78-79) it is stated that original appeals to the General
Executive Council (which is what this was since President
Byron disqualified himself from considering it) shall include ''all documentary evidence and argument which the
appealing party or parties may deem necessary for tlie
proper consideration of the appeal." And in Section 3 (b)
it is said that the decision of the General Executive Council shall be based "only upon the evidence and argument
submitted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this seetion [except that oral argument may be permitted]."
Section 4 of Article Nineteen provides for referral of
appeals from decisions of the General Executive Council
to the Grievances and Appeals Committee ''for consideration and report and the decision of the General Convention
shall be recognized and accepted as final. ' ' ( Exh. 53, P.
79, 80) Nothing in the constitution would indicate that
new evidence could be received by the Grievances and Appeals Committee.
Hanley and Nance unquestionably could have incorporated all of their alleged refuting documentary evidence
and affidavits of testimony of alleged refuting witnesses
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into their formal written appeals. Had this been done,
all of such purported evidence would have been considered
by the Grievances and Appeals Committee, and thus, by
the General Convention.
When asked why he did not include documentary evidence to rebut the findings of the trial board, Hanley responded with the unsatisfactory answer that it was too
voluminous. He conceded, nevertheless, that there was no
limit upon the size of their appeal or the number of documents that could have been annexed thereto. (N.J.T. 205206).

THE ALLEGED POLITICAL CONSPIRACY
TO EXPEL NANCE AND HANLEY
Plaintiffs-Respondents Nance and Hanley tried to establish in the court below a political motivation to explain
their being charged with misconduct and expelled. Their
contention was that the charges filed were false, and known
to be false by President Byron, but filed nonetheless because this was the only way that they could be kept away
from the convention of Defendant-Appellant Union in Montreal, Canada. Their presence at the convention was supposed to have been feared because they would advocate
passage of two resolutions, to wit:
(1) a resolution to change the method of selecting
General Vice Presidents which would have required
them to be selected out of specific geographical areas.
(Exh. 12), and
(2) a resolution to retire President Byron and create
for him the position of president emeritus. (Exh. 13).
The trial court did give credit to some of this political
evidence, and he found that both President Byron and the
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members of the trial board had knowledge of, and were opposed to, the Plaintiffs-Respondents' advocacy of those two
resolutions. As nearly as we understand the ruling of the
court below, it further found that Byron resented their political activities and that their participation therein was
at least a partial explanation for the filing of charges
against them (although the court also found that justifiable
cause for filing the charges existed). In the court's opinion,
moreover, the trial board was unduly influenced in their
conduct of the trial proceedings and in their decision to
hold the trials in absentia by a desire to cooperate with Byron in his efforts to expel Hanley and Nance. (R. 646-648,
paragraphs 20, 21, 24, 25, 26).
These latter findings, among others, presumably served as the predicate for the Court's conclusion that having
or permitting trials in absentia was unreasonable, arbitrary, and malicious as well as illegal, which, in turn, was
the basis for the court's subsequent award of punitive
damages.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE \YR.ONGFULLY EXPELLED FROM :MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANTAPPELLANT UNION, AND THAT THEIR EXPULSIONS ARE NULL AND VOID.
A.

The Court erred as a ~latter of Law In Finding
and Concluding that the Plaintiffs-Respondents
Did Not Refuse to Stand Trial Before DefendantAppellant Union's Trial Board.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

B.

The Court Erred as a :\fatter of Law In Finding
and Concluding that the Trials In Absentia of
Plaintiffs-Respondents Violated their Rights Under the Constitution of Defendant-Appellant
Union and Under the Law Forbidding the Taking,
of Property \Vithout Due Process of Law.

C.

The Court Erred as a :Matter of Law In Finding
and Concluding that Plaintiffs-Respondents'
Remedy Upon Appeal Through the DefendantAppellant Union Tribunals was Inadequate and
Did not Cure the Alleged Defects of the Trial
Board Proceedings Below.
POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT- APPELLANT UNION AND
SOME OF ITS OFFICERS WERE MALICIOUS, ARBITRARY, AND UNREASONABLE IN CONNECTION
\YITH THE PREFERRING OF CHARGES, TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL THROUGH THE UNIOX TRIBUNALS.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUNITIVE
(EXENIPLARY) DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED FOR PLANTIFFS-RESPONDENTS' WRONGFUL
EXPULSIONS FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP.
A. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law In Allowing
Punitive Damages in Mandamus and Injunction
Proceedings.
B.

The Court Erred as a Matter of Law In Allowing
Punitive Damages in a Breach of Contract Action.
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C.

If Punitive Damages Were Allowable, the Court
Erred as a Matter of Law in Refusing to Submit
All Such Damage Issues to the Jury.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AWARDS OF NOMINAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE CIR.
CUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
A.

It Was Error for the Court to Award Nominal
Damages after the Jury Returned a Verdict that
No Compensatory Damages Were Suffered by
Either of the Plaintiffs-Respondents.

B.

It Was Error for the Trial Court to Award Punitive Damages "\Vithout Having an Award of Compensatory Damages Upon Which to Base It.

C.

The Award of Punitive Damages Is Wholly Disproportionate to the Nominal A ward.

POINT V
THE COURT ERRED AS A :MATTER OF LAW IN
HOLDING THE MEMBERSHIP OF DEFENDANTAPPELLANT UNION LIABLE IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR ALLEGED ~!(ALICE OR BAD FAITH ON
THE PART OF ITS OFFICERS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE EXPULSIONS OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS IN. THE ABSENCE OF A FI~DL\G OF RATIFICATiON BY TfiAT BODY OF SUC~ ALLEGED
'VANTON OR l\[ALICIOUS CONDUCT.
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POINT VI
TH~J

COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE
AND THE POWER TO ENFORCE A WRIT OF :MANDATE OR A MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST
A NON-RESIDENT UNINCORPORATED LABOR ASSOCIATION CO~IPELLING SUCH ASSOCIATION TO
REINSTATE PLANTIFFS-RESPONDENTS.

POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND
DIS~IISS ACTIONS BECAUSE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION IS NOT SUBJECT TO PROCESS IN
THE STATE OF UTAH.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ALLOWING EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES
AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION.

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
TAXING CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTAPPELLANT UNION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE WRONGFULLY EXPELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANTAPPELLANT UNION, AND THAT THEIR EXPULSIONS ARE NULL AND VOID
A.

The Court Erred as a Matter of Law In Finding
and Concluding that the Plaintiffs-Respondents
Did Not Refuse to Stand Trial and that the Trials
In Absentia Violated Their Rights Under the Constitution of Defendant-Appellant Union and the
Law Forbidding the Taking of Property Without
Due Process of Law.

We are combining under Sub-Section A the first two
Sub-Sections under Point I.
The evidence of Plaintiffs-Respondents contemptuous
and disruptive conduct before Defendant-Appellant Union's
trial board has already been summarized in the Statement
of Facts. Nothing can be added here that would enhance that
description, but we do once again urge the court to read
the verbatim transcripts of the hearings on June 3rd, 4th,
and 7th, printed under separate cover, in the Appendix.
We will now show that the Plaintiffs-Respondents
were accorded the full measure of their rights regarding a
trial on the charges preferred against them, under both
the constitution of Defendant-Appellant Union and the applicable principles of due process of law.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the legal principles
involved, however, we want to point out some fundamental
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t>tTors or misconceptions of the court below, which perhaps
tend to explain the ultimate error in the final judgment.
The court below erroneously believed that a trial in
absentia was virtually illegal per se. This attitude was
made apparent as early as October 23, 1957, when the court
granted Plaintiff-Respondent Nance's motion to strike the
entire Answer of Defendant-Appellant Union to his Petition for Writ of :Mandate despite the fact that DefendantAppellant Union had stated as a defense, inter alia, that
Nance, Hanley, and others frustrated the attempts of the
trial board to conduct their trials.
At the conclusion of the case, nearly two years later,
the trial court held to the same view. Thus, in assigning
reasons for amercing Defendant-Appellant Union in punitive damages twenty thousand times as great as the actual
(nominal) damages suffered by the two Plaintiffs-Re~pondents, the .•court said:
"(a) That trial in absentia, where there has been no
consent or waiver, is abhorrent to the principles of
Justice and fair play. (R. 6'52)
"(g) That the [Defendant-Appellant Union] in upholding the action of its officers and Trial Committee
is attempting to defend trial in absentia-a hateful
thing in any ci1.:ilizPd society." (R. 653) (Emphasis
ours.)
\V e, of course, are not attempting to defend trial in absentia as a general proposition. But if a union member,
through misconduct, frustrates the holding of his trial, his
rights of a trial cease. He can thereafter be found guilty of
the charges and expelled, either by default or upon the
basis of a trial in absentia at which evidence is received.
Of the many paragraphs contained in the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court below, not
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a single one is critical of the deportment of Hanley and
Nance or their close confederates Fuller, Nichols, and
Vaughn. No criticism, either, was made of conduct of
the crowd in the trial room. It would appear that so far
as the court below was concerned, the Union's trial board
committed grossly illegal acts by refusing to comply with
the requests made by Hanley, Nance, and their compatriots, but that the latter for their part were under no legal
duty to comply with any of the requests made, or conditions
imposed, by the trial board. From what one can gather
from reading the decision of the court below, the actions
and general conduct of Hanley and Nance are very models
of decorum for accused members of any unincorporated
association. This, of course, simply cannot be correct.
The trial court never was able to comprehend that the
question of the ultimate soundness of Hanley's and Nance's
motions for bills of particulars and continuances, and their
other demands made during the course of the "open hearings'' was utterly immaterial as an issue in this case. They
were guilty of misconduct nothwithstanding that their objections to any of the trial board's rulings might have been
well-taken because they would never comply with the trial
board's liminal rules so that such requests, demands, and
motions could be submitted properly for consideration.
Had they been willing to do this, some, and perhaps most,
of those matters might have been resolved by the trial
board in their favor.
Their grievous mistake was in refusing to stand trial
on conditions laid down by the trial board and refusing even
to let the trials get started. Instead, they took the position
that any trials that would take place would have to be
conducted strictly on their terms. If the trial board had
given in on this point, a state of anarchy would have resulted.
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TilE ELEJ[ENTS OF DUE PROCESS
REQUIRED FOR UNIO~ TRIALS
The authorities all substantially agree that the elements of fair play or due process of law applicable to trials
of a member of an unincorporated association are (1) notice of the charges of misconduct and (2) an opportunity
for the member to be heard in his own defense. As is stated
in OAKES, THE LAw OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
CoNFLICTS (1927) ~54 at page 60:
'' 'The law insures to every member of a voluntary association a fair trial, not only in accordance
with the constitution and by-laws of the association but
also with the demands of fair play, which in the final
analysis, is the spirit of the law of the land.'
''He is therefore entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard in his own defense." (Emphasis ours.)
See also : DANGEL AND SHRIBER, THE LAw oF LABOR UNIONS
(1941) ~ 180 at pages 205 and 206.
A good statement of this proposition is also found in
Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.
2d 6 (1951) at page 11:
"It is a fundamental principle of justice that no
man may be condemned or prejudiced in his rights
without an opportunity to make his defense, and this
r>rinciple is applicable not only to courts but also to
labor unions and similar organizations. Taboada v.
Sociedad Espanola De Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal
187, 191, 215 P 673, 27 ALR 1508; Ellis v. American
Federation of Labor, 48 Cal App2d 440, 443, 120 P2d
79. It is, of course, true that the refined and technical
practices which have developed in the courts cannot be
imposed upon the deliberations of workingmen, and the
form of procedure is ordinarily immaterial if the accused is accorded a fair trial. See McConville v. Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union, 106 Cal App 696, 701 289 P
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852; 30 Columb L. Rev 847, 852; 4 Am Jur 471-472; 7
CJS, Associations §25, ·page 61. The union's procedure, however, must be such as will afford the accused
member substantial justice, and the requirements of a
fair trial will be imposed even though the rules of the
union fail to provide therefor. Taboada v. Sociedad
Espanola De Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal 187, 192,
215 P 673, 27 ALR 1508; Von Arx v. San Francisco
Gruetli Verein, 113 Cal 377, 379, 45 P 685; Ellis v. American Federation of Labor, 48 CaL App 2d 440, 443444, 120 P2d; see Dangel and Shriber, Labor Unions
[1941] 204-206; Martin, Law of Labor Unions [1910]
384-386. The authorities recognize that such a trial
includes the right to notice of the charges, to confront
and cross.,.examine the accusers, and to examine and
refute the evidence.'' (Emphasis ours.)
The proposition that trials before a labor union's tribunal do not have to be conducted with the same formalities and under the same rules as courts of law is also supported in Pratt v. Amalg. Assn. of Street and Electric Rwy
Emp. of Am., Utah, 167 Pac 830 (1917).
The notice issue which Hanley tried to urge before
the trial board and later in the trial court is all but frivolous. We shall not even argue this insubstantial point, but
shall merely state that he undoubtedly had adequate notice of his charges. Nance concedes that he had notice, well
in advance of the hearings.
As to the second element of due process, the record in
this case establishes that Hanley and Nance were
accorded an opportunity to have a trial on their charges
with full rights toexamine and cross-examine all witnesses
and to introduce testimony and exhibits. To put it more
strongly (and accurately), the record shows that this is
what the Defendant-Appellant Union desperately wanted
to give them. The opportunity was qui_te convincingly refused, however.
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THE TRIAL IX ABSENTIA
\YAS NOT ILLEGAL PER SE
There are a number of cases which hold that a· trial of
a member of an unincorporated association in his absence
may be valid under certain conditions.
In Smith v. Kern County Medical Assn, 120 P 2d 874,
877 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1942), the member failed to show up at
the appointed time and place for his trial. The court said:
''There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of the trial court. The procedure provided by the rules of the society was followed and the
petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend
himself. He may not be allowed to complain that hearings, of which he had due notice and opportunity to
attend, were conducted in his absence. The requirements of the law are fulfilled when the accused is afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. Levy
v. l\1:agnolia Lodge, IOOF, supra. If the society did
not receive evidence from the accused himself, it was
not a failure of the law or the rules adopted by the
society, but a failure on the part of the accused when
he voluntarily absented himself from hearings of
which he had due notice."
See also: Davis v. IATSE, 141 P. 2d 486, 488 (Cal. App.
1943) and vVerner v. Int. Assn. of Machinists, 11 Ill. App
2d 258, 137 NE 2d 100 (1956).

Miller v. I.U. of Opr. Engineers, 257 P. 2d 85, 87 (Cal.
App. 1953) presents a situation more closely analogous to
the case at bar. There, the trial of two Los Angeles members of the union was scheduled in Chicago. The members
demanded a trial in Los Angeles but were informed, instead, that their expenses to Chicago would be paid. The
expenses of two representatives was to have been paid also.
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A continuance was requested and granted. Then other continuance was sought, denied, and they were tried in absenltia. The court ruled :
''The constitution did not give plaintiff the right
to be tried in Los Angeles. It was within the discretion of the board under the constitution to hold the
trial in Chicago. The accused were notified by letter
of October 18, 1950, that a trial would be held November 14th. They demanded a trial in Los Angeles and
they were infQ-rmed by the general secretary-treasurer
that if they attended the trial in Chicago their reasonable expense would be approved and paid. Through
their spokesman they replied, demanding payment of
their expenses of travel and while in attendance upon
the hearing, and also their wages during the time they
would be away from work. They were then requested to select two of their number to appear at the trial
as their representatives and provision was made by
the secretary for two airplane tickets for the representatives to be selected. This procedure was rejected by
the members. The hearing was postponed from November 14th to November 16th for the appearance of
some repre~entatives, but no appearance was made
and the hearing was had on the 16th. The board found
that the dem,ands of the alccused were unreasonable,
that they had acted in bad faith and had no intention
of attending the trial. Under these circumstances the
contention that the accused 'were not given an opportunity to confront the witnesses and to be heard in
their defense cannot be sustained." (Emphasis ours.)
Similarly, the trial board of Defendant-Appellant Union
properly ruled in the case at bar that Hanley, Nance, and
the others accused had not in good faith apy:>eared for trial.
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TRIALS MAY BE CO~DUCTED IN THE
ABSENCE OF A PARTY IN COURTS OF LAW
Even in actions in courts of law there are situations
where trials and portions of trials are validly conducted
in the absence of a party. A default judgment in civil actions is the first example that comes to mind. But there are
other ones too.
For instance, in Brown v. Stroeter, 263 SW 2d 458
(Kan. Cit., Mo., Ct. of App. 1953), a suit in equity to cancel
a lease, one of the parties changed counsel just before the
trial. She did not appear at the trial but her new lawyer
sought a continuance which was denied. The trial court
felt that the change in counsel was made for purposes of
delay, and the court of appeals affirming held at page 462:
''Whether or not a court has abused its discretion
in the rna tter of proceeding with the hearing of a case
in the absence of a party or his attorney depends upon the particular facts and circumstances in the given
case."
In Thorpe v. Thorpe, 171 P 2d 126, 129 (Cal. 1946) a
wife failed to appear in her husband's divorce action, although it was a contested case. The court felt her affidavit of illness was not made in good faith and proceeded
with the trial. The court said:
"As has already been pointed out, the right of
a litigant to be present to defend or prosecute an action is not absolute.''
In Miller v. Grier 8. Johnson, Inc., 62 S.E. 2d 870, 873,
(Sup. Ct. of App. Va. 1951) the court proceeded to trial
despite defendant's affidavit of illness. The reviewing
court, in affirming, said:
"A litigant not only has a right to be present at
the trial, but it is presumed that he will be present for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

the purpose of aiding and assisting in the protection of
his rights. However, a litigant forfeits this privilege
or right when it appears that his absence is for the
purpose of forcing a continuance which tends to hinder and delay the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.''
Even in criminal cases, the right to be present at trial
is not absolute. In State v. Aikers, Utah, '51 P. 2d 1052,
1056 ( 1935) this court said :
'' [Defendant] usually will not be permitted to
take advantage of his own misconduct when he has
voluntarily absented himself from the trial. It is one
thing for him to absent· himself when he is at liberty
and may voluntarily do so, and quite another thing
for the court to deprive him of any substantial right
against protest ....

*

*

*

"A defendant is entitled to be safeguarded in
every constitutional right, but should not be permitted to so juggle with such rights as to embarrass and
delay the courts or to defeat the ends of justice.''
And the following quotation from Falk v. United
States, 15 App D.C. 446, error dismissed, 180 U.S. 636
(1899) [23 ALR 2d 484] is very much in point. There, the
prisoner escaped from jail and fled during the course of his
trial. The Court of Appeals said:
"It is unfortunate, perhaps, that in several of the
cases cited the fact of escape or absconding by an accused person under indictment, and whose trial has
been commenced, has been held to be a waiver of the
right of the person to be present at the whole trial and
at every stage of the trial. In our opinion, there is no
question of waiver here of any right. The question is
one of broad public policy, whether an accused person,
placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the
safeguards with which the humanity of our present
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criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the
proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a
~olemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its
own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle
of personal liberty. Neither in criminal nor in civil
cases will the law allow a person to take advantage of
his 01cn wrong. And yet this would be precisely what
it would do if it permitted an escape from prison, or an
absconding from the jurisdiction while at large on
bail, during the pendency of a trial before a jury, to
operate as a shield from further prosecution for the
crime. An escape is itself a criminal offense, although
now rarely punished independently of the principal offense for which the party is held. Can it be that an
ad, which is in itself a criminal offense, is to be allowed in law to oper3:te as a release from criminal
prosecution, and therefore ultimatel:v from criminal
liability? We can not think that the constitutional
guarantee in its practical application will lead us to
any conclusion so absurd. The Constitution was no~
intended to shield the guilt~? from the consequences of
crime, but to protect the innocent.'' (Emphasis ours.)
See also: Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 457-460
(1912).
A trial in absentia, thus, is not necessarily abhorrent or
illegal, and, as we have shown, courts of law have in appropriate circumstances proceeded with trials in the absence of a party or of the accused. The cases cited aboYe
indicate that tpere are far worse things than trials in absentia, one of which is to thwart or subvert one's right to
trial by one's own misconduct and then to seek to reap advantage from that fact. This is precisely what Hanley
and Na nee did here.
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THE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA WERE JUSTIFIED
UNDER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
UNION'S CONSTITUTION
The trials of Hanley and Nance were held before a
trial board consisting of General Officers of DefendantAppellant Union, as is permitted in Section 3 of Article
Eighteen (18)- of the Union constitution. (Exh. 53, page
76-77). Section 3 (b) thereof provides:
''The General Officer or Officers designated by
the General President shall constitute a trial board
and all parties shall be given the same opportunity to
present evidence and exhibits, to cross-examine witnesses, and for the accused to be represented by a good
standing member of his local union as counsel, to
which they would be entitled in a trial before a local
union trial committee, as provided in Section 2 of this
Article.'' (Emphasis ours.)
Section 2(h) of Article Eighteen (18) (Exh. 53, page
75-76) provides:
"Except as provided in paragraph (i) of this
-Section, should the accused refuse, fail or neglect to
appear for trial after due notice, the trial committeeshall proceed with the trial, hear such evidence as
may be presented by witnesses who respond to notice
and render its findings, decision and recommendations.''
The trials in absentia given to Hanley and Nance and
also to Car1 Nichols and John Fuller were all in strict conformity with Sections 2 and 3 of Article Eighteen (18).
The accused members (Hanley, Nance, Nichols and Fuller}
did not appear for trial on June 3, 4 and 7, 1954, in the sense
that "for trial" means for purposes of going to or submitting to trial. They physically appeared in the rooms
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appointed as the trial rooms but only to insure that their
trials would not take place.
Likewise, on Tuesday, June 8, 1954, they were afforded still another opportunity to appear before the trial
board and go through trials on their charges, but again
they refused to take advantage of it.
The opportunity to attend and participate in a trial
which is required under the Union constitution and under
principles of fair play or due process of law was, therefore, extended to each of them. Having declined to accept
those opportunities, they have no right now to complain
that they subsequently were found guilty of the charges
preferred against them in trials at which they were not in
attendance.

NANCE AND HANLEY WERE NOT ENTIT-LED TO
ANY RELIEF BECAUSE THEY DID NOT COl\fE
BEFORE THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS
Recently, the California Supreme Court in Allen v.
Los Angeles County District Co1tncil of Oarpenters, 337 P.
2d 457 (1959), denied reinstatement' to an expelled union
member, despite the fact that there were irregularities in
the proceeding before the union tribunals. In that case
the expelled member refused to state whether he was a
Communist. The court said at page 461:
''The proceeding before the trial court for a writ
of mandate was an equitable proceeding, in which the
trial court was vested with a wide discretion. Parker
\~. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344; Bartholomae Oil Corp. v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal 2d 726; Rogers v. Board of Directors of Pasadena, 218 Cal. 221 ; El Camino L. Corp.
Y. Bd. of Supervisors, 43 Cal. App. 2d 351 ;- N eto v. ConSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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selho Am or. etc., 18 Cal. App 234. The doctrine of
'clean hands' was therefore applicable. 32 Cal. J ur. 2d,
Mandamus, §8, pp. 125-126. Thus, even assuming some
showing of irregularity in the proceedings before the
union committee, plaintiff may not successfully contend on this appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the writ in the absence of a showing
in the trial court that he came into court with 'clean
hands,' and that he was entitled to the relief demanded, which was reinstatement to membership in the
union. See N eto v. Conselho Am or etc., supra, 18 Cal.
App 234; Note 36 A.L.R. 508. Plaintiff made no such
showing but, on the contrary, refused to answer the
question relating to his eligibility to attain or retain
such membership.''
We do not believe, frankly, that the clean hands rule
is needed to dispose of this case. The ruling of the trial
court below is patently erroneous, as a matter of law.
The trial court's basic proposition that the trials in absentia were illegal under the Union constitution and principles of due process of law is erroneous in the circumstances of this case.
Nevertheless, it is entirely accurate to observe that,
even if the Union trial board had committed some errors
and had deprived Hanley and Nance of son1e rights, the
utterly contemptuous misconduct on their part 1nore than
nullified these errors, and they would not have been able
to come into the trial court below with clean hands, so as to
be entitled to the extraordinary equitable relief of reinstatement to membership in Defendant-Appellant Union.
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POINT I

B.

'/'h(' C'ourt Erred As a Matter of Law In Concl~td
ing That Plaintiffs-Respondents' Remedies Upon
Appeal Thro~tgh Defendant- Appellant Union's
Trib nuuls were Inadrquate and Did Not Cure tll e
Alleged Defects of the Trial Board Proceedings
Below

Time does not permit a lengthy discussion of the rights
of Hanley and Nance in the appellate tribunals of Defendant-Appellant Union. Suffice it to say that extensive
and effective appeal procedures are provided for an aggrieved member of the Union in Article Nineteen ( 19) of
the Constitution. (Exh. 53, page 78-80).
The appeals, which are to be filed in writing, are required to contain such documentary evidence and argument
as the appealing parties may deem necessary for a proper
consideration of their appeals, and decisions on appeals
are to be based solely on the record of the case, the written
statements of the appeals, and the documentary evidence
and argument incorporated or annexed thereto. Article
Nineteen (19), Sec. 3(a), 3(b). Oral argument may be permitted, but it is limited to evidence in the record of the
trial or incorporated into the written appeal. Article Nineteen (19), Sec. 3(b).
Had Nance and Hanley wanted to refute any of the
findings of the trial board or to expose any of the alleged
political machinations on the part of President Byron or
any other General Officers, they had ample opportunity
to cite these matters in their appeals and submit affidavits
or other documentary evidence to corroborate them. They
would then have given the association an opportunity to
rule on those issues in the first instance, and to remedy
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forthwith any errors made by the trial board or any abuses
of power on the part of their General Officers. But they
declined to be specific with respect to such matters in their
written appeals.
It cannot be said now that errors or mistakes committed by the trial board would not have been remedied upon
appeal if proper supporting evidence had been submitted.
In fact, the indications are all to the contrary, as is evidenced by the Grievances and Appeals Committee's exhonoration of the charge against Hanley that he improperly
directed John Fuller to act as a representative of Local
Union 371 without authority to do so. This is the only
charge that Hanley attempted to refute by documentary
evidence incorporated into his written appeal.
To the extent that Hanley and Nance had refuting evidence which~they neglected or failed to annex to their written appeals, they to such extent failed to exhaust their
remedies within the association, and, thus, would not be entitled to any relief in the courts. See: THE LAw OF LABOR
UNIONs, DANGEL AND SHRIBER, §186, p. 211-215, in support
of this well-recognized rule requiring exhaustion of internal remedies within the organization.
The failure of Hanley and Nance to take advantage of
their rights upon appeal within the union should not, therefore, become the basis for a finding that their remedies upon such appeal were inadequate. The trial court below
erred in so ruling.
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POINT II
THE COFRT ERRED IN HOLDIXG THAT THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION AND
:-.;ol\lE OF ITS OF.,FICERS WERE l\IALICIOUS, ARBITRARY, AND UNREASONABLE IN CONNECTIOK
vVITH THE PREFERRING OF CHARGES, TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL THROUGH THE UNION TRIBUNALS
On December 30, 1958, the trial court found that the
trials afforded Hanley and Nance denied them rights under
the Union constitution and under principles of due process of law. This was the sole basis for finding that the
expulsions were void and ordering Defendant-Appellant
Union to reinstate them to membership forthwith.
Approximately five months later the trial court in a
supplemental memorandum of decision found that the expulsion proceedings were not only illegal but also malicious,
arbitrary, and unreasonable. See: Second Supplemental
Memorandum of Decision (R. 600-614). It was not contemplated that these findings as to malice or bad faith would
be considered as a ground for holding the expulsions of
Hanley and Nance illegal, since they had already been held
illegal, but, rather, such findings were to bear on the question whether punitive damages would lie. See: Pre- T. 9-558. 2-5 and Order As To Issues To Be Submitted To .Jury
(R. 367-369). This is also clear from a reading of the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and his
Judgment and Decree. (R. 641-657). Had the previonf;
ruling, rendered on December 30, 1958, in the l\tfemorandum
of Decision, been that the expulsions were not illegal under
the Union constitution or applicable principles of due process of law, the case at bar would have ended, and Nance's
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Petition for Writ of Mandate and Hanley's Complaint in
Intervention would have been dismissed.
Therefore, if the court agrees with our argument under
Point I above, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and dismissed, and none of the other points to be
argued hereafter would need to be reached.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CHARGES WERE NOT PREFERRED IN GOOD FAITH
The most important "bad faith" contention made by
Hanley and Nance during the trial in the court below was
to the effect that President Byron preferred false charges
against them in bad faith, purely for the purpose of preventing them from sponsoring two resolutions at Defendant-Appellant Union's General Convention to be held in
Montreal, Canada, in August of 1954.
It would be disingenuous to fail to acknowledge the
fact that there was testimony, days and weeks of testimony,
on the subject whether President Byron and other General
Officers knew of Hanley's and Nance's political plans and,
if so, whether they opposed them. The court found, erroneously we believe, that President Byron knew of these plans
and opposed and resented them, and that he preferred
charges against Nance and Hanley partly, at least, to prevent them from supporting the two resolutions at the General Convention. Regardless of such conclusion, however,
the filing of the charges was warranted and justified.
The trial court at the same time found that President
Byron had received reports which, if believed, would have
justified his preferring charges against them. (R. 647-648).
These were the Stetter reports and the communications
from Ira Fulmor and Henry Ely. The reports from those
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sources which implicated I-Ianley and (to a somewhat lesser
extent) Nance in a murder, in shakedown activities against
contractors, etc., were so shocking that President Byron
would virtually have been impelled to charge them with
misconduct, and force them to defend themselves against
those despicable accusations. President Byron, or any
other Union leader, would himself have been guilty of
gToss misconduct had he refused to take action after rereiving such serious documented evidence of misconduct
on the part of members of his organization.
0

Thus, at most, the evidence adduced on this issue of
good faith in the preferring of the charges gave rise to
two conflicting inferences. In these circumstances it was
error for the court to draw the inference of bad faith. As
pointed out in 20 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 224 On the subject of inferences and presumptions of good faith, honesty
and fair dealing:
'' .... It is further presumed that men intend to do
what they have the right and power to do, rather than·
what is beyond their right and power. In those cases
where different inferences may be drawn from the
same state of circumstances it is the duty of the court
to presume in favor of innocent conduct, rather than
intentional and guilty misconduct.''
See also: N.L.R.B. v. Hu,ber & Huber .Z11otor Exp., 223 F2d
748, 749 ( C.A. 5th 1955) where the court said:
" .... As stated above, the record discloses that
there existed several reasons for the unpopularity of
Barnett, both with the management and with the Union
Officers, and where the Board could as reasonably· infer a proper collateral motive as an unlawful one, the
act of the management rannot be set aside by the
Board as being improperly motivated.''
Accord: Schofield v. ZCMI, Utah, 39 P. 2d 342, 345 (1934).
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Actually, here the inference of good faith in preferring
the charges is much stronger than the contrary one, because ·it is based upon facts which if reported to a:ny reasonable man would have induced him to take the same action as President Byron, i.e.: prefer charges.
The trial court found that President Byron delayed
too long before preferring charges and did not do so until
he learned of Hanley's and Nance's political activities. (R.
647-648). This is wholly unfounded.
To reach this erroneous conclusion the trial court had
to find that President Byron should have preferred charges against Hanley and Nance solely on the basis of some
unverified reports of misconduct given to him by representatives of certain Los Angeles contractors. These reports
were made first in December of 1953 and then again in February of 1954. The trial court evidently felt that President Byron either should not have bothered to make his own
investigation using Grant Stetter, Murphey and O'Malley,
or that he should not have waited until such investigation
had been completed, which was around the 9th of ~fay,
1954, before preferring the very serious charges against
Hanley and Nance. (N.J.T. 4926-4927). Neither premise
is tenable, of course, and the record establishes that Byron
acted prudently and with reasonable dispatch in preferring
the charges.
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THE C<>rHT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
Jl ~1\lBERS OF THE TRIAL COI\Il\IITTEE WERE
UNDULY INFLUENCED IN THE CONDUCT OF
THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND IN THEIR
DECISION BY A DESIRE TO COOPERATE
\VITH PRESIDENT BYRON IN HIS EFFORTS
TO EXPEL HANL:BJY AND NANCE
The finding that the members of the Trial Committee were "unduly influenced" in the conduct of the
trial proceedings and in their decision by a desire to cooperate with President Byron in his efforts to expel Hanley and Nance is wholly unsupported by evidence and also
confusing.
The trial court did not hold that the Union trial board,
or any member of it, was biased against Hanley and Nance,
nor did the court hold that they would not have had fair
trials if they had stood trial before it. Quite to the contrary,
the trial court below held the expulsions of Hanley and
Nance were void specifically because they were not present at their trials before that very trial board. (R. 651652).
The transcript of the three days of "open hearings,"
best proves the fact that the trial board of Defendant-Appellant Union gave Hanley and Nance "every break in the
books.'' They did not recess the trials prematurely, but
only after three aggravating sessions that would have
broken the patience of Job. From such a record, it cannot
be inferred that their decision to recess the hearings and
resume them in absentia was "unduly influenced" by some
ulterior desire to cooperate with President Byron.
With respect to the reasonableness or correctness of
the trial board's decision finding Hanley and Nance guilty
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of the charges preferred against them, this is a matter that
the court never inquired into, and which is not an issue in
the case. See: Pre-T., 9-5-58, 2-·5. To the extent that there
is any misapprehension on this point, however, we submj.t
that there was substantial evidence received during their
trials in absentia which more than supports the findings
of the trial board. See : Exh. 7 and 10.
THE REMAINING FINDINGS OF BAD FAITH
AND UNREASONABLENESS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA AND
APPEALS ARE MERE ADDITIONAL
INFERENCES DRAWN FRO:Vf THE FACTS
The other findings of the trial court respecting arbitrariness, malice, and bad faith are mainly based upon a
reevaluation of the conduct of the trial board, the General
President, and the General Convention with respect to
matters such as denying requests for continuances and bills
of particulars and even of the act of permitting Hanley and
Nance to be tried in absentia. The trial court merely belatedly characterized them as arbitary, unreasonable, and
malicious in nature, as well as illegal.
\Ve have already argued that the denials of those requests and motions was brought about because Hanley and
Nance never consented to the trial board's rules of procedure and, thus, the trials were never in session so that such
matters were up for rulings. Such conduct was therefore
not illegal; a fortiori, it was not arbitary, unreasonable or
malicious. The findings and conclusions of the trial court
as to these matters of malice and bad faith should be reversed.
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POINT III
THE (~()URT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUNITIVE
(EXEMPLARY) DA1fAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED
FOR PLAINTIFFS- RESPONDENTS' WRONGFUL
EXPFLSIONS FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP AND
FURTHER ERRED IN AMERCING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT UNION WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOR MISCONDUCT OF ITS OFFICERS IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF RATIFICATION BY THE
UNION OF SUCH ALLEGED WANTON OR MALICIOUS CONDUCT
Points III, IV, and V will be considered under this
heading and argued as one.
A.

The Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Allowing
Punitive Damages in M and am us and Injunction
Proceedings.

Plaintiff-Respondent Nance filed his action herein
in the form of a Petition for Writ of Mandate. Our research of authorities has failed to bring to light a sing·le
instance in which a court has awarded punitive ( exemplary) damages in a mandamus proceeding. There is no
statement in any standard reference work, such as AMERICAK JuRISPRUDENCE or CoRPUS JuRIS SECUNDUM, that supports the recovery of punitive damages in a mandamus suit.
On the other hand, in 32 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 2d 287
it is stated:
"It is extremely doubtful whether the court in a
mandamus proceeding could or should award exemplary damages.''
The conclusion that punitive damages are not obtainable in a mandamus suit is fortified by the fact that mandamus is a special form of action which is essentially
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equitable in nature; that is to say, it is a proceeding in
which equitable principles are applicable. See: 34 .AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 829; 32 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 2d
119.
These equitable rules, then, would apply to Nance's
Petition for Writ of Mandate as well as to Hanley's Complaint in Intervention, which is purely a proceeding in
equity for injunctive relief and damages. In a comprehensive annotation in 48 .A.L.R. 2d 948, the authors state
that the majority rule, adopted in all but a few states, is
that punitive or exemplary damages may not be recovered
in a proceeding in equity. At page 950 of the annotation,
it says:
''The several theories advanced by the courts as
the basis for the rule that punitive damages may not
be recovered in courts of equity are: (1) .A court of
equity does not have the power to award punitive damages; (2) the awarding of punitive damages is incompatible with the principles and practice of equity; and
(3) by seeking equitable relief, a litigant waives all
claim to punitive damages. It should be noted that in
refusing to award punitive damages the courts have
frequently based their holdings upon several or all
of these theories.
'' There are, however, a number of cases in which
the courts have denied punitive damages in equity or
have recognized that such damages may not be recovered in equity without stating upon what theory they
based their decision.''
According to the annotation, at least 18 states plainly
hold that punitive damages may not be recovered in equitable proceedings, and only two jurisdictions, to wit: California and Tennessee, definitely allow them.
It is not clear where Utah stands in respect to this
proposition, but we submit that the majority rule is based
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upon sound principles and ought to be followed. To allow
punitive damages to lie in equitable proceedings would go
far towards destroying all remaining distinctions between
legal and equitable actions,

B.

The Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Allowing
P~tnitive Darnages For A Breach of Contract.

The general rule of contract law with respect to damages is that the plaintiff is limited to a recovery of the actual loss he has sustained by reason of the breach. 15
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 442. With respect to punitive
damages it is said in 15 AMERICAN JuRISPRUDENCE 709:
'' .... According to the overwhelming weight of
authority, exemplary damages are not recoverable in
actions for breach of contract, although there are dicta
and intimations in some of the cases to the contrary."
While Hanley and Nance are proceeding in equitable
actions, the wrong that they seek to remedy is in the nature of a breach of contract. A wrongful expulsion from a
labor union is a breach of the contract of membership between the member and the union. Recently, in !.A.M. v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 2 L.ed. 1018 (1958) the Supreme
Court held:
P. 618 ". : . under California law membership
in a labor union constitutes a contract between the
member and the union, the terms of which are governed by the constitution and by-laws of the union, and
that state law provides, through mandatory reinstatement and damages, a remedy for breach of such contract through wrongful expulsion. This contractual
conception of the relation between a member and his
union widely prevails in this country .... "
In accord is Pratt v. Amal. Ass. of Street & Elec. Rwy.
Emp. of Am., Utah, 167 Pac. 830 (1917).
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Punitive damages were sought but not recovered in
Gonzales, supra, which was also a mandamus suit. Chief
Justice Warren, speaking in dissent, said at page 628:
'' .... The right of action for emotional disturbance, like the punitive recovery the plaintiff sought unsuccessfully in this case, is a particularly unwelcome
addition to the scheme of federal remedies because of
the random nature of any assessment of damages."
(Emphasis ours.)
Other cases denying punitive damages for breaches of
contract are Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Ooal
Oorp. 69 F. 2d 131 ( C.A. 6th 1934); Young v. Main, 72 F2d
640 ( C.A. 8th 1934); Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal 2d 713, 221
P. 2d 9 (1950); Chelini v. }lieri, 32 Cal 2d 480, 196 P. 2d
915 (1948); and White v. Metropolitan Merchandise ..liJart,
107 A. 2d 892 (Del. 1954).
Punitive damages should accordingly have been denied in the case at bar on the ground that they do not lie
for breach of a contract of union membership.

C.

The Court Erred in Not Subm,itting the Issue of
Punitive Dam,ages to the Jury, If They Were Allowable.

If we assume that the issue of punitive damages was
properly allowed in this case, the court still erred in not
submitting such issues to the jury. Some punitive damage issues were submitted to the jury at the trial below but
not all of them. The jury found that the Defendant-Appellant Union was not guilty of any malice or bad faith and
that Hanley and Nance were entitled to no punitive damages, and, in fact, no damages at all. The only punitive
damages allowed in the case were those assessed by the
court itself.
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ages and the rule which we believe applies in Utah, is that
they an' strictly and peculiarly within the province and dis('retion of the jury. A good statement of this rule is found
in ran Lom v. Schneider ill an, 210 P. 2d 461, 469, 11 A.L.R.
:!d 1195, 1206 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1949) :
''In the trial of a case where exemplary damages
are sought the judge determines as a matter of law
whether there is evidence of malice, and, if he decides
that there is, the assessment of such damages is committed to the discretion of the jury. Cholia v. Kelty,
155 Or 287, 291, 63 P2d 895; Martin v. Cambas, 134 Or
:237, 262, 293 P 601; Gill v. Selling, 125 Or 587, 591, 267
P 812, 58 ALR 1556. The Supreme Court of the United States says: 'This has always been left to the discretion of the j?.try, as the degree of punishment to be
thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.' Day v. Woodworth, 13 How 363,
371, 14 L Ed 181. And the jury has entire diseretion
to refrain from giving any punitive damages at all
even though all the elements of malicious and damaging misconduct may have been established. McCormick on Damages 296, §84; 4 Sedgwick on Damages
2660, §1318. '' (Emphasis ours.)
See also: '53
D.

AMERICAN tTURISPRUDENCE

167-168.

E1·en if Punitive Damages Were Allowable, the
Court Erred in Assessing them Against Defendant-Appellant Union in the Absence of a Finding
that the Malice or Bad Faith of the Union Officers
TV as Known to or Ratified by the llf ember ship.

Defendant-Appellant Union as a voluntary, unincorporated association consists of, and has no identity separate from, its entire membership. A union's citizen.ship,
for instance, is coextensive with the citizenship of all its
members. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. 1Jfarine &
Shipbuilding Workers~ etc., 95 F. Supp 50 (D.C. Pa. 1951);
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Ex Parte Edelstein, 30 F2d 636 (C.A. 2d 1929), cert. denied
279 u.s. 851.
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in M architto v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 88 A2d
851 (1952), a union is a common enterprise or joint venture
in which each of the members is a co-principal with all of
the others. There the court said:
P. 856 " .... It [the union] is not a separate legal entity
in the eyes of the law, having no existence apart from
that of its individual members. At common-law it
couldneither sue nor be sued .... In legal effect plaintiff and every other member of the Brotherhood are
co-principals joined together in a joint enterprise to
accomplish a common purpose with their relationships
to each other and to the group being governed by the
association's constitution and the by-laws or rules
adopted pursuant thereto, and by the common law.''
A judgment against Defendant-Appellant Union is enforced against its treasury, which is the joint property or
asset of the entire membership. It is thus necessarily true
that to mulct the Union with punitive damages is indirectly
to assess them against the whole membership. We submit
that, regardless of the rule as to the liability of the union
for actual damages proximately caused by acts of their officers or agents, the bad faith or malice of such officers or
agents ought not to be imputed to the membership in the·
absence of a showing that the membership knew of the
malicious nature of the acts and approved or ratified the
same.
This point was decided in Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 Fed.
522 (C.A. 2d 1911), cert. denied 223 U.S. 729 (1912) where
the court said at page 526:
'' .... Surely the fact that an individual joins an
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petration of arson or murder. Something more must
be shown, as, for instance, that with the knowledge
of the members unlawful means had been so frequently
used with the express or tacit approval of the association, that its agents were warranted in assuming that
they might use such unlawful means in the future, that
the association and its individual members would approv.e or tolerate such use whenever the end sought to
be obtained might be best obtained thereby.''
To the same effect is Sweetman v. Barrows, 161 N.E. 272
(Mass. Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Schneider v. Local 60, 116 La.
270, ·5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 891 (1905); and in Martin v. Curran,
303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E. 2d 683, 685, 686 ( 1951) the New York
Court of Appeals held that in a libel action against officers
of a union sued in their representative capacities there
had to be allegations and proof that such libels in the union's newspapers were ratified by the membership. There,
the court said :
''A voluntary, unincorporated membership association is neither a partnership nor a corporation. It
is not an artificial person, and has no existence independent of its members. Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N.Y.
353, 361; see Niven v. Spickerman & Stever, 12 Johns.
401. No agency of one member for another is implied.
McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 95, supra. 'A part
of the members of a voluntary organization cannot
bind the others without their consent before the act
which it is claimed binds them is done, or they, with
full knowledge of the facts, ratify and adopt it.' Sizer
Y. Daniels, 66 Barb. 426, 432-433. So, until the passage
of the statutes which were the precursors of article 3 of
the present. General Association Law, all the members
of such a group were necessary parties defendant in
any suit on an alleged association liability, and could
not be sued through their officers. Van Aernam \~.
Bleistein, 102 N.Y. 355, 358.
:11:

:11:

:11:

''So, for better or worse, wisely or otherwise, the
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Legislature has limited such suits against association
officers, whether for breaches of agreements Qr for
tortious wrongs, to cases where the individual liability of every single member can be alleged and proven.
Despite procedural changes, substantive liability in
such cases is still, as it was at common law,' that of the
members severally'. Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of Amer. R.R., 132 F. 2d 408, 410, certiorari denied 319 U.S. 744. 'In the kind of association now under consideration, only those members are liable who
expressly or impliedly with full knowledge authorize
or ratify the specific acts in question'. Wrightington
on Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts,
§64. '' (Emphasis ours.)
The court below never found that the membership of
the Union, or their representatives, the delegates to the
General Convention, ever learned that Presidnt Byron acted in bad faith or maliciously in preferring charges against
Hanley or Nance. Similarly, the court never found that'
~ny alleged malice or ill will or undue influence on the part
of the trial board or the Grievances and Appeals Committee was brought to the attention of the membership. Moreover, Hanley and Nance, by failing to incorporate any evidentary matter into their written appeals, did not do anything to apprise the membership of the Union of malice
or bad faith on the part of any officer or agent of the Union.
The membership of Defendant-Appellant Union did
not have any opportunity to ratify any alleged malice or
bad faith in connection with Plaintiffs-Respondents' expulsions because they never learned of it, and, therefore, even
assuming that in a case such as this punitive damegs could
be awarded, they would lie only against those members
and officers who had evil motive and intent in connection
with the expulsion proceedings. None of those persons
was named as a defendant in the case at bar, however.
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E.

If Jras l'.J'rror for the Court to Award Nominal
/)n 111aqes after the Jury Returned a Verdict that'
No Compensatory Damaqes Were Suffered by

Either of the Plaintiffs-ResJW1ulents
So far as the record of this case reveals, every damage issue involved was to be submitted to the jury, except
for those limited issues which the trial judge kept from the
jury pursuant to his Order As to Issue to Be Submitted to
the Jury. (R. 367-369). The trial court never reserved for
himself the right to rule upon any elements of actual or
compensatory damages. See Pre-T., 1-13-59, 11-12. Note
also the following colloquy between the court below and
counsel at page 50 of the January 13, 1959, pre-trial conference:
"THE COURT: Under the suggestion of the court,
the question of bad faith or malice up to the time of
the expulsion would be left to the court, including any
punitiYe damages for that if the question were found
in favor of the [Plaintiffs-Respondents].
'' ::\'IR. FISHER: Yes, but how about the compensatory damages~
"THE COURT: Beg pardon~ All the compensatory
damages would be left to the jury."
and further at page 51 thereof:
'' ~IR. SANDA OK: In other words, if we were to so
stipulate, yon would still allow this jury to hear elements of compensatory damages, including pain, suffering, humilation for the pre-expulsion period which
would in effect allow Nance and Hanley to reopen
their testimony as to humiliation, pain and suffering in
that pre-expulsion period which might go back of May
15th?
":JIR. DREYER: :May I be heard on that, your Honor~ All that v\·e can recover by way of compensatory
damages is damages that naturally and proximately
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flowed from the expulsion. I don't see how pain and
suffering prior to .the expulsion or pain and mental
distress can have anything to do with it.
''MR. SANDACK: Or Humiliation.
''MR. DREYER: It is the damages flowing from
the expulsion that is included in the compensatory
damages.
'"MR. FISHER: I am not too convinced of that Mr.
Dreyer, unless you want to stipulate that. If the court
would make a finding that there was malice in the
original preferment of charges, I would have some
question as to whether humiliation and mental anguish
suffered from the date the charges were first issued
might not possibly be an element of the case.
''MR. DREYER: I think it would be part of the
punitive damages."
The court below, therefore, had no justification for
belatedly reevaluating the same evidence that the jury
scrutinized and giving Nance and Hanley nominal damages where the jury previously ruled that neither of them
was entitled to even one cent. Counsel for the PlaintiffsRespondents state at page 5 of their Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Ord~r on Motion to Settle Record (filed in the
Supreme Court of January 22, 1960):
''Among other things [Defendant-Appellant Uni·on], as shown by its statement of points, is attacking the trial court's award of nominal domages. That
award is based entirely on thP evidence adduced at the
trial tohich began on February 9, 1959. (Emphasis
ours.)
This was an attempt indirectly to give them a judgment n.o.v. when, as a matter of law, as the trial court
properly ruled, they were not entitled to it.
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F.

It JV as Error for the Trial Court to Award Punitive Dama,ges Without Having an Award of Compensatory Damages Upon which to Base It

In any event, however, the award of punitive damages
in this case is erroneous as a matter of law because in Utah,
as in the vast majority of states, punitive damages are not
allowed unless compensatory damages based on the tortious or illegal conduct are recovered. Such as the ruling of this court in Graham v. Street, et al, Utah, 270 P. 2d
456, 459 ( 1954). There the court held:
"Defendants next contend that the court erred
in allowing $5,000.00 punitive damages. We agree.
As was the case with compensatory damages, there
are no specific pleadings, only a general allegation of
fraud in the amended complaint. Standing alone, the
failure to s.et forth a specific pleading may not be fatal since the damage may follow as a conclusion of law
from the allegation of fraud, 15 Am. Jur., Damages,
Sec. 304: however, the general rule is that there can
be no pttnitive damages without compensatory damages based on the tort. Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mon.
75, 214 P. 606, 33 A.L.R. 381. And see Falkenburg v.
Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008; Evans v. Garsford,
Utah, 247 P. 2d 431; and cases cited in annotation in
33 A.L.R. 384. Hence, the failure to allege and prove
a tort giving rise to compensatory damages vitiates
the claim for punitive damage. (Emphasis ours.)
See also the comprehensive new annotation on punitive
damages in 17 A.L.R. 2d 527 et seq.
Only a minority of jurisdictions permit an award of
punitive damages to be based upon nominal damages and
Utah is not among them. 17 A.L.R. 2d. '542-545.
The Graham case would seem conclusively to establish the error of the court below in awarding punitive
damages in this case.
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G.

The Award of Punitive Damages is Erroneous
Because It Is Wholly Disproportionate to the
N aminal Award

Even if Utah allowed the recovery of punitive damages based on an award merely of nominal damages, the
grossness of the verdict for punitive damages in the present case would nevertheless be erroneous. In Utah there
is the additional requirement that the punitive award must
bear some reasonable relationship to the amount of actual
damages recovered. Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269
Pac. 1008 (1928) (where a verdict of $5,000.00 punitive to
$362.50 compensatory was held excessive, and the court
ordered a remitter of $3,500.00). This rule is still in effect
in Utah, as it is in a number of other jurisdictions; and in
Ostertag v. LaMont, Utah, 339 P2d 1022, 1024 (1959) this
honorable court recently said:
'' .... The jury fr01n its advantaged position must
necessarily be allowed a broad discretion in such matters. It is true that this court has stated a number of
times that the punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship to actual damages. This is so because they must not be so disproportionate as to manifest that they were awarded as a result of passion or
prejudice, or under misconception of, or in disregard
of the law or the evidence. But the relationship of the
punitive damages to actual damages awarded is only
one of the facts to be considered in determining whether the amount awarded should be sustained.''
See also: annotation in 17 A.L.R. 2d at 548-549.
The two punitive verdicts in the case at bar of $20,000.00 each based upon nominal recoveries of $1.00 each,
are so wildly disproportionate as to be virtually prejudicial per se. These verdicts, moreover, were imposed, in
part, on account of the fact that the Union had the temerity
to defend this case in the first place (although the Union
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was the defendant) and, because the trial below cost the
eounty and its taxpayers some money. (R. 652-653). Evidently, the court below saw fit to penalize Defendant-Appellant Union for defending itself instead of confessing
judgment in a case in which its actions were proper in the
circumstances and the plaintiffs themselves were guilty of
serious n1isconduct. The court, thus, in its Findings of
B,aet and Conclusions of Law held that ''In determining the
amount of exemplary damages the following matters are
entitled to consideration:
(a) That trial in absentia, where there has been no
consent or waiver, is abhorrent to the principles of justice and fairplay.
(b) That in this case the wealth and power of an international union was arrayed against individual
union members with meager resources.
(c) That appeals were timely taken, and respondent's officers and its Grievances and Appeals Committee refused to reverse the action of the Trial Committee despite the fact that the· transcript of the trial proceedings unmistakably showed that the trials had been
had in the absence of the accused and without their
consent and obviously over their objections.
(d) That continuously since on or about July 1, 1954,
the petitioner and intervenor have been known andreferred to as expelled members and have been deprived
of the benefits and privileges of union membership.
(e) That petitioner and intervenor have been put to
the expense of a costly and very prolonged trial, over
constant objections of respondent and two intermediate appeals, in order to obtain redress in the court.
(f) That taxpayers have been burdened with the expense of a greatly prolonged trial despite the fact that
respondent's officers and its Trial Committee and appellate tribunal had full knowledge that trials of petitioner and intervenor upon the charges herein involvSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ed had been held in their absence, without their consent
and over their obvious objections.
(g) That the respondent in upholding the action of
its officers and Trial Committee is attempting to defend trial in absentia - a hateful thing in any civilized society."
The reasons assigned by the court as warranting the imposition of punitive damages are not only improper but
highly prejudicial.
These reasons would also support the reversal of the
punitive damage award herein, even if the other grounds
were not sufficient.
POINT VI
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE
AND THE POWER TO ENFORCE A WRIT OF MANDATE OR A MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST A
NON-RESIDENT UNICORPORATED LABOR ASSOCIATION COMPELLING SUCH ASSOCIATION TO
REINSTATE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND
DISMISS ACTIONS BECAUSE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION IS NOT SUBJECT TO PROCESS
IN THE STATE OF UTAH
A. Defendant-Appellant Union Was Not, And Is Not,
Subject to Service of Process in the State of Utah
Since None of the Acts Complained of by Plaintiffs-Respondents Arose Out of any Business
Transacted By Defendant-Appellant Union in the
State of Utah
Points VI and VII will be argued as one.
Two settled doctrines of Utah law were specially pleaded in Defendant-Appellant Union's Motion to Quash the
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Alternative \Vrit of Mandate. (R. 8, 9). The motion was
overruled (R. 25) by the court below.
(1) The court lacked jurisdiction to enforce extraterritorially the mandatory injunction order against nonresident labor association; and

No jurisdiction was acquired over the person of
this out of state association.
(2)

These pleas were raised by special appearance prior
to answer and stand to date unwaived on the record.
In Pratt v. Amalgamated ..Association of Street & Electrical Railway Employees of America, Utah, 167 Pac 830
at page 835, this court early held:
''No one, we think, will be bold enough to assert
that we could enforce our judgment outside the state.
If, therefore, we enter a judgment, and the defendants
refuse to convene, and take the action required of them,
by what means could we coerce them to comply with
the judgment.''
In Pratt, plaintiff commenced a proceeding to compel
the defendants to reinstate him as a member of defendant's
association, a labor union, claiming an illegal expulsion.
The defendants lived in different states of the union, one
having his home in Salt Lake City. The principal office
of the association was Detroit, Michigan. It had under its
control subsidiary associations called local divisions in
various states of the United States and Canada. The holding in Pratt squarely supports Defendant-Appellant Union's theory that the lower court had neither the power nor
jurisdiction to grant and especially to enforce a writ of
mandate directed against a non-resident, unincorporated
labor association compelling reinstatement of respondents.
The court further erred in refusing to quash service
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of process for the reason that Defendant-Appellant Union
was not subject to service of process in the State of Utah.
In W ein v. Crockett, Utah, 195 P. 2d 222 (1948), the
making of a single contract within this state was sufficient
for the court to establish jurisdiction under 78-27-20, U.C.A.
1953, '' ... in any action arising out of the conduct of such
business.'' Critical to this decision was the court's recognition that the cause of action arose in Utah, the availability of Utah witnesses, and the laws of Utah controlled and
governed the cause.
In W ein, the court did not feel it an unreasonable imposition to require a non-resident to defend at the place in
which he committed the alleged wrong and where the witnesses would be available for trial.
Hanley is a non-resident of Utah (N.J.T. 28). Nance
claimed a residence at Nephi, Utah (N.J.T. l520) through
his wife's interest in a home. All of Nance's employment
was outside the state, at his "temporary residence" in Las
Vegas, Nevada (N.J.T. 1425). The activities of which
they vigorously complain took place, by their own story,
in Las Vegas, Nevada ; Miami, Florida; Los Angeles, California; Chicago, Illinois; Washington, D. C.; Montreal,
Canada ; Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona.
It is undisputed that Defendant-Appellant Union is a
voluntary, unincorporated labor association with its principal office in Washington, D. C. (R.6). Article One, Section 1, Constitution. No representative or agent authorized to act for or on behalf of Defendant-Appellant Union
resided in Utah (R. 12).
If Tll ein extends 4( e) ( 4), U.R.C.P. against non-resident individuals or associations, even for a single business
transaction or a single tort, it must be predicated on actions
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which arise out of business done by the non-resident in the
State of Utah. This critical point is entirely absent from
all claims of the Plaintiffs-Respondents.
Therefore, no jurisdiction ever legally attached against
the Defendant-Appellant Union which Plaintiffs-Respondents were entitled to ground either of their lawsuits.
POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ALLOWING EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS - RESPONDENTS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES
AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION
The attorneys fees issue in this case was also decided
erroneously.
We do not dispute the fact that in proper circumstances Nance would be entitled to an allowance of a reasonable
attorney's fee as an element of damages, provided, of
course, he should prevail in his mandamus suit. He is not
entitled to prevail in his madamus suit, however, but, regardless of that, his contract for services of counsel is such
that he suffered no damages or loss on account of employing them, and, thus, in those circumstances, he can not
properly claim attorneys fees as an element of his damages.
Hanley, on the other hand, did not proceed on a mandamus theory, so that he is not entitled to an allowance of
attorney fees in any circumstances under the law of Utah.
The general theory or rule is that attorneys fees may
not be recovered by the prevailing party as an element of
damages or as part of the allowance of court costs. In 15
AMERICAN JuRISPRUDENCE 550, it is said:
''As a general rule, in the absence of any contractual or statutory liability therefor, attorneys' fees
and expenses incurred by the plaintiff or which the
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plaintiff is obligated to pay, in the litigation of his
claim against the defendant, aside from usual court
costs, are not recoverable as an item of damages, either in an action ex contractu or an action ex delicto."
In Utah the legislature has engrafted certain exceptions to the general rule quoted above, and one of the few
kinds of civil actions in which attorneys fees are recoverable by a prevailing party as part of his damages is mandamus. This exception is expressly recognized in Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P. 2d 914
(1938).
But the Colorado Development Co. case, supra,
made it clear that attorneys fees are not properly a part
of damages unless the prevailing party has in fact suffered loss of income by incurring attorneys fees and thus
truly is ''damaged.'' He must have, in other words, paid,
or contracted to pay, an ascertainable sum to his counsel
as attorneys fees. As this court said in syllabus 19 to the
Oolorado Development Co. case, supra:
"In mandamus proceeding, knowledge of court as
to value of services of attorney revealed by words and
records on file and appearances of counsel would be
insufficient to justify an award of attorneys fees as
damages within statute without other evidence as to
contract to pay or actual payment for services." (Emphasis ours.)
The fee arrangements between Hanley and Nance and
their attorneys, McCune and Dreyer, is absolutely incredible. Nance himself knew nothing of his fee arrangement
except that vaguely it was contingent. (Post-T. 4/27/59,
98-99). Dreyer felt that the arrangement was for a 50%
contingent fee, with which McCune agreed. (Post-T.
4/27/59, 115, 120). In addition, there was some even vaguer
agreement among the attorneys only that, if they recovered no money for their clients but succeeded nevertheless
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

68

in having them reinstated, their clients would H@VeFtas
then, pay them a ''reasonable fee.'' The clients, Hanley and Nance, were not shown to have ever expressly
agreed to this.
The trial court wrongfully allowed the two PlaintiffsRespondents punitive damages of $40,000.00, out of which,
if it is allowed to stand, the two attorneys, McCune and
Dreyer, were entitled to $20,000.00. 3 We see no basis upon
which the court could remake this so-called agreement for
either the attorneys or their clients. The court, in effect,
gave attorneys fees to Dreyer and McCune when it awarded
their clients punitive damages. It was error to give more
than this.

~

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
TAXING CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTAPPELLANT UNION
Over Defendant-Appellant Union's objection, the lower court taxed certain costs in favor of Plaintiffs-Respondents. (R. 721). The disputed items related to allowance of
witness fees and mileage for C. E. Vaughn, Charles C.
Williams, Jack Berry, George Mitchell, Aubrey Long, Alfred Long, W. J. Horne, Joseph Hanley, Joe Long and
Robert L. ~icElvany. Each of these witnesses attended the
jury phase of the trial coming from Las Vegas, Nevada.
(R. 662, 663). The amount allowed Plaintiffs-Respondents for these witnesses and their mileage amounts to
$598.00 which constitutes an improper allowance.
All these witnesses appeared voluntarily and without
subpoena for the Plaintiffs-Respondents. They testified
3If the judgment below is reversed, as it should be, then Hanley
and Nance would not, as losing parties, be entitled to an allowance by
the court of attorneys fees as damages or costs under any concept or
theory.
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entirely in connection with the jury trial damage phase of
Plaintiffs-Respondents' claims. Since the jury rejected
Plaintiffs-Respondents' claim for damages, it can hardly
be argued that Plaintiffs-Respondents "prevailed," yet
the trial judge included the fees for these witnesses in his
final costs bill allowed. (R. 721).
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P. provides:
''To Whom A warded. Except when express provision therefore is made either within a statute of this
state or in this rule, costs shall be awarded as of course
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs ... "
21-51-8, U.C.A. 1953 provides:
''The fees of witnesses paid in civil causes may be
taxed as costs against the losing party.''
While the rule gives the court a wide discretion, allowance of costs to a party whose case has been rejected
by the jury would constitute an abuse of the court's discretion. There can be little argument that Plaintiffs-Respondents did not prevail and in fact lost the jury trial phase
of the case.
Under prior law, in Checketts v. Collings, Utah, 1 P. 2d
950 ( 1931) it was held that defendant was the prevailing
party since he defeated plaintiff's cause, inasmuch as the
jury found that neither the complaint nor the counterclaim
established a cause of action. Hence, on the entire case,
the plaintiff lost and the defendant won and thus, the defendant was the prevailing party entitled to judgment and
to costs.
Under the present rules of civil procedure, the court
probably has a wider discretion to divide or apportion
costs, but certainly not to allow them to a defeated party.
The Defendant-Appellant Union may not complain that.
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ing the jury phase of this case, but it has grounds to object when $598.00 is allowed Plaintiffs-Respondents for a
case which they lost.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the brief hereinabove, we
ask the ~ourt to reverse the decision of the court below,
and enter judgment for the Defendant-Appellant Union. A
denial of such relief will, in truth, place labor unions, and
associations generally, at the mercy of unscrupulous members who commit offenses against the law of the society but
who also refuse to go through the procedures necessary to
stand trial before duly constituted tribunals of the society.
Respectfully submitted,
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